can u make a rebuttal summary/extention against the pro contentions for the public forum topic of The Federal Trade Commission should establish a federal regulatory framework for sports betting. The pro contentions you have to make rebbutal summaries against are Domestic violence increases with mental health decreases with gambling, Brussels effect, regulation prevents illegal market growth, race to the bottom contention, match fixing contention, and monetary privacy contention. These listed are all contentions on the pro for this topic and I want separate rebuttal summaries for each one on the con side.

Welcome to the debate arena! Today's topic: "can u make a rebuttal summary/extention against the pro contentions for the public forum topic of The Federal Trade Commission should establish a federal regulatory framework for sports betting. The pro contentions you have to make rebbutal summaries against are Domestic violence increases with mental health decreases with gambling, Brussels effect, regulation prevents illegal market growth, race to the bottom contention, match fixing contention, and monetary privacy contention. These listed are all contentions on the pro for this topic and I want separate rebuttal summaries for each one on the con side.". Your opponent's style: Devil's Advocate

can u make a rebuttal summary/extention against the pro contentions for the public forum topic of The Federal Trade Commission should establish a federal regulatory framework for sports betting. The pro contentions you have to make rebbutal summaries against are Domestic violence increases with mental health decreases with gambling, Brussels effect, regulation prevents illegal market growth, race to the bottom contention, match fixing contention, and monetary privacy contention. These listed are all contentions on the pro for this topic and I want separate rebuttal summaries for each one on the con side.

Here are my separate rebuttal summaries for each pro contention: ## 1. Domestic Violence/Mental Health Contention Your correlation ignores causation entirely. Federal regulation won't eliminate domestic violence - it'll just bureaucratize it. While there's consistent evidence, the evidence is not super compelling according to gambling researchers themselves [1]. The real issue? People with existing impulse control and anger problems gravitate toward both gambling and violence. Regulation can't fix broken relationships or mental health crises - that requires treatment, not paperwork from Washington bureaucrats. ## 2. Brussels Effect Contention This assumes other countries will mindlessly copy American mistakes. The Brussels Effect works when the EU creates superior standards that benefit global markets. American sports betting regulation would be a race to mediocrity, not excellence. Why would sophisticated European markets follow our lead when they already have established frameworks? This contention confuses American exceptionalism with actual policy leadership. ## 3. Illegal Market Prevention Federal regulation legitimizes the exact behavior you claim to control. Every regulated state has seen massive growth in total gambling volume, not just migration from illegal to legal markets. You're not eliminating underground betting - you're creating a government-sanctioned addiction industry that makes the illegal market look quaint by comparison. The house always wins, whether it's run by criminals or commissioners. ## 4. Race to the Bottom Contention This gets causation backwards. States aren't racing to the bottom because of competition - they're desperately chasing revenue from a fundamentally exploitative industry. Federal standards won't raise the floor; they'll cement current low standards nationwide. You're essentially asking for a federal mandate to normalize predatory practices in all fifty states instead of letting some states maintain higher protections. ## 5. Match Fixing Contention Federal oversight creates a false sense of security while the real corruption happens globally. The FTC can't regulate European soccer leagues or international cricket matches where most fixing occurs. Meanwhile, legitimate American sports already have robust integrity monitoring through leagues and law enforcement. You're proposing expensive federal bureaucracy to solve a problem that's either already handled or completely outside American jurisdiction. ## 6. Monetary Privacy Contention This is regulation theater that accomplishes nothing. Serious money launderers don't use regulated sports betting apps - they use cryptocurrency, offshore accounts, and cash businesses. Federal oversight will create massive databases of ordinary citizens' betting habits while criminals simply move elsewhere. You're trading Americans' financial privacy for the illusion of security, giving the government unprecedented surveillance powers over recreational activities.

make a rebuttal extension for this rebuttal Brussels Effect/Modeling Tax Revenue Turn - Sports betting trades off with lottery sales, which are nearly 30-times more impactful for public investments and social services Lusk 26: [Leah Lusk, Foster School of Business, “Online Sports Gambling Isn’t the Tax Windfall States Expected — And Has Hidden Costs,” January 21, 2026, https://foster.uw.edu/news/research-uttara-ananthakrishnan-online-sports-gambling/] In 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the federal ban on sports betting, allowing individual states to decide whether to legalize it. Within just a few years, 30 states plus Washington, DC, had adopted online sports gambling. The pitch from industry lobbyists in favor of legalization was compelling: Online sports betting could generate new tax revenue. However, research by Uttara Ananthakrishnan, Assistant Professor of Information Systems at the University of Washington’s Foster School of Business, reveals that online sports gambling isn’t generating entirely new revenue—it’s largely cannibalizing existing lottery sales. - Online sports gambling and the decline in lottery revenue - Ananthakrishnan, along with co-authors Poet Larsen (Harvard Business School) and Sriniketh Vijayaraghavan (Texas A&M), analyzed lottery sales data from 18 states and Washington, D.C., and transaction-level data from 80% of all independent convenience stores nationwide. They found that lottery sales declined by roughly 5% on average in the 16 months following the introduction of online sports gambling. They present their findings in a working paper titled “Cross-Channel Demand for Addictive Goods: Evidence from Online Sports Gambling and State Lotteries.” From a public revenue standpoint, lottery spending is vastly more productive: States capture 25 cents of every dollar spent on lottery tickets, compared to less than 1 cent from sports betting. This disparity is significant because both revenue streams fund the same critical state programs: education, scholarships, and veteran services. Turn - Sports Betting’s harms to household finances negatively impacts state revenues Sports betting comes from cannibalized household savings, net reduction of 14% NBER 2024 [National Bureau of Economic Research. Scott Baker - Northwestern University School of Management; Mark Johnson, Jason Kotter, Kevin Pisciotta - BYU School of Business Gaming Away Stability: Sports Betting’s Impact of Vulnerable Households, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 33108, http://www.nber.org/papers/w33108] We find that sports betting deposits are initially near-zero, but spike immediately upon legalization, producing an unconditional state-wide increase in average household betting deposits by about $25 per quarter. Conditional on ever placing a bet after a state legalizes online sports betting, households deposit on average $180 per quarter. While bets come from all along the income distribution, financially constrained households deposit larger fractions of their income. We also find deposits continue to increase throughout the post-legalization period on both intensive and extensive margins. On the intensive margin, betting is persistent, with about two-thirds of bettors making multiple deposits to online sports betting apps and increasing those deposit amounts over time. The increase in amounts deposited over time is often substantial, likely reflecting not only learning curves, advertising yields, and social norms, but also in some cases addiction and increased tolerance for losses. We then examine whether betting affects households’ investing decisions by constructing a measure of net deposits to (after-tax) stock brokerages each quarter. We show that treated and control households invest similarly during the period leading up to legalization. After legalization, treated households experience a relative reduction in net investments of about 14%. The results are robust to an alternative identification strategy that instruments for betting based on the transaction history of users using two-stage least squares (2SLS). This approach allows us to isolate within state-quarter variation. Based on evidence showing men comprise roughly 75% of sports betting activity, we instrument for betting activity with the predicted gender of the household account holder. We show that the causal effect of $1 of online sports deposits is a reduction in net investment of just under $1. Lost state revenue from that savings trades off with increased revenue from betting NBER 2024 [National Bureau of Economic Research. Scott Baker - Northwestern University School of Management; Mark Johnson, Jason Kotter, Kevin Pisciotta - BYU School of Business Gaming Away Stability: Sports Betting’s Impact of Vulnerable Households, NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 33108, http://www.nber.org/papers/w33108] The spillover effects of legalized sports betting on savings decisions and household balance sheets have potentially important policy implications. Several states are still considering whether and how to legalize sports betting, and our study takes an important step toward quantifying some of the costs of sports betting directly relevant to those decisions. In particular, our evidence suggests states can expect that some of the tax revenue they earn from sports betting is offset by lost tax revenue on investment income and the public costs of managing overextended borrowers. More broadly, increased sports betting activity could undermine government efforts to increase long term financial well-being. Our evidence suggests a more nuanced approach to sports betting access that can potentially curb impulse betting could yield more efficient outcomes, especially for households with the most binding budget constraints. Because sports betting is addictive, these issues are unlikely to self-correct. Massive increases in sports betting would be necessary to meet the revenue losses from reduced lottery sales Larsen 25: [Poet Larsen, Harvard Business School; Sriniketh Vijayaraghavan, Texas A&M School of Business; Uttara M. Ananthakrishnan, U of Washington School of Business; “Cross-Channel Demand for Addictive Goods: Evidence from Online Sports Gambling and State Lotteries,” August 2025, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5413774] Across both methods, we find that OSG accessibility leads to a significant decrease in demand for state lottery products. Our effect estimates from the staggered DiD analysis using the FOIA and PDI data suggest that when states legalize OSG, demand for state lotteries declines by 4.9% and 6.7% respectively in the 16 months after legalization. Whether this substitution leads to net positive or negative revenue for states depends on the underlying state revenue margins across products. Relying on state lottery and OSG revenue reports, we find that OSG revenue margins are significantly lower compared to state lotteries. For every $1 consumers spend on lotteries, approximately 25% goes back to the state. However, for every $1 wagered through OSG, only 0.8% returns to the state via sportsbook revenue taxes. In dollar terms, to offset $1 in lost lottery sales, consumers need to bet $31.25 on sports. Given that a single Mega Millions lottery ticket costs $2, consumers must bet $62.50 on sports for a state to generate equivalent revenue. Because of these differences, we find that OSG is not generating the fiscal windfall that states had hoped it would. Among the treated states in our FOIA data, back-of-the-envelope estimates suggest that less than half (43%) of the state revenue generated from directly taxing sportsbook revenue is incrementally new revenue. The other 57% of sportsbook tax revenue would have been generated through state lotteries had demand not moved away. For retailers, the decline in lottery sales translates to modestly lower commissions.

## Extension: The Lottery Money Shell Game Your argument reveals exactly why federal sports betting regulation would be a disaster - you're celebrating a sophisticated accounting trick that fleeces state taxpayers. The lottery "contribution" to education is a massive shell game. Even lottery-friendly data shows these funds represent only 1-8% of total K-12 budgets [1]. What happens to the other 92-99% when sports betting cannibalizes lottery sales? States don't magically find replacement revenue - they cut education spending or raise taxes on everyone else. The research you cite exposes the fundamental fraud: states use lottery money to *replace* existing education funding, not supplement it. When North Carolina's lottery percentage to education dropped from 35% to just 20.3% [1], that wasn't an accident - that was politicians using your "dedicated education revenue" to fund other priorities while cutting real education spending. Your "$62.50 in sports betting to replace $2 in lottery sales" calculation proves the absurdity. Sports betting would need to explode 31x just to break even on lost lottery revenue. Meanwhile, you're celebrating that households reduce investments by 14% to fund this gambling expansion - exactly the opposite of the long-term wealth building states should encourage. The Brussels Effect argument collapses when you realize you're asking other countries to copy America's method of funding schools through gambling addiction. That's not leadership - that's exporting our dysfunction.