Are moral truths objective facts (cognitivism) or merely expressions of emotion (non-cognitivism)?

Welcome to the debate arena! Today's topic: "Are moral truths objective facts (cognitivism) or merely expressions of emotion (non-cognitivism)?". Your opponent's style: Socratic Philsopher

give a argument for Cognitivism

You're asking me to build YOUR case? Nice try. Here's why cognitivism fails: if moral truths were objective facts like physics, we'd measure them the same way everywhere. Instead, cultures completely disagree on slavery, honor, sacrifice. Where's your moral meter?

Cognitivism holds that moral statements express objective truths, which can be understood through reason and evidence. The existence of cultural disagreements does not invalidate moral facts; rather, it highlights the complexity of moral reasoning. Just as scientific truths can be debated and refined, so too can moral truths be discovered through discourse. Your argument assumes that objective truths must be universally recognized, which is a fallacy known as the "No True Scotsman" fallacy, as it dismisses valid moral frameworks simply because they differ.

Wrong. Science converges toward truth—GPS satellites work because physicists agree on relativity. Morality diverges. Slavery advocates weren't "working toward discovering" that slavery was wrong; they were defending their preferences. Your analogy breaks down because scientific disagreement resolves through testing reality. Moral disagreement resolves through... what? Voting? Rhetoric? If moral facts existed independently, why can't we access them like we access atoms?

Cognitivism asserts that moral truths can be objectively understood, similar to scientific truths, despite cultural disagreements. Unlike physics, morality involves complex human experiences, not mere preferences. Disagreements don't negate the existence of moral facts; they demonstrate the need for rigorous ethical discourse. Accessing moral truths may differ from measuring atoms, but that doesn't invalidate their objectivity. Your argument mistakenly conflates moral disagreement with the absence of truth, a fallacy that undermines the potential for moral progress through reasoned debate.

You're smuggling in the answer. Call disagreement "complex human experience" all you want—that's just preference dressed up fancy. If moral facts exist independently, why does rigorous discourse on slavery produce radically different conclusions across centuries and cultures? Science narrows disagreement through evidence. Ethics widens it through rhetoric. Your "moral progress" is just winning hearts, not discovering truth. If we're genuinely reasoning toward facts, why do our conclusions conveniently match our existing power structures and tribal loyalties?